Legionnaires’ Disease Outbreak in Murcia, Spain by García-Fulgueiras, Ana et al.
An explosive outbreak of Legionnaires’ disease
occurred in Murcia, Spain, in July 2001. More than 800 sus-
pected cases were reported; 449 of these cases were con-
firmed, which made this the world’s largest outbreak of the
disease reported to date. Dates of onset for confirmed
cases ranged from June 26 to July 19 , with a case-fatality
rate of 1%. The epidemic curve and geographic pattern
from the 600 completed epidemiologic questionnaires indi-
cated an outdoor point-source exposure in the northern
part of the city. A case-control study matching 85 patients
living outside the city of Murcia with two controls each was
undertaken to identify the outbreak source; the epidemio-
logic investigation implicated the cooling towers at a city
hospital. An environmental isolate from these towers with
an identical molecular pattern as the clinical isolates was
subsequently identified and supported that epidemiologic
conclusion.
L
egionnaires’ disease (LD) has been an emergent dis-
ease since the 1970s. In the last few years, the
increased use of a simple test for detecting urinary antigen
Legionella pneumophila serogroup 1 in patients with
pneumonia has facilitated diagnosis (1). Transmission by
aerosols has been extensively reported, and evidence of
Legionella in aerosols derived from cooling towers has
been provided (2–5). Although a considerable body of epi-
demiologic evidence exists for the association of LD out-
breaks with aerosols produced by cooling towers, some
controversy exists about the role that cooling towers play
in LD (6–13). 
We describe an explosive outbreak of LD that occurred
in July 2001 in Murcia, a municipality with 360,000 inhab-
itants in southeastern Spain. We also report results of a
case-control study performed to identify the source of this
outbreak, which turned out to be a cooling tower. The out-
break of pneumonia was first detected on July 7. At the end
of the first day of active surveillance, July 8, approximate-
ly 100 cumulative suspected cases were reported. More
than 800 suspected cases were recorded by July 22, when
the last case was treated, 2 weeks after the onset of the
investigation. The epidemiologic investigation using a
case-control study emphasizes a combination of strategies
to measure and analyze an outbreak of LD that occurs in
an area with many large potential sources of environmen-
tal contamination.
Methods
Case Detection 
An active surveillance system to detect patients with
any form of pneumonia was established on July 8 at all
hospitals in the region of Murcia. Any reported case of
pneumonia was considered a suspected case of LD if this
diagnosis could not be ruled out. A confirmed case of LD
was defined as a case of pneumonia with laboratory evi-
dence of acute infection with Legionella including a) iso-
lation of any species or serogroup of Legionella from res-
piratory secretions, lung tissue, or blood, b) a fourfold or
higher rise in antibody titers from 1:128 against L. pneu-
mophila SG1 by immunofluorescence or microaglutina-
tion in paired acute- and convalescent-phase serum speci-
mens, or c) detection of L. pneumophila antigen in urine.
An epidemiologic questionnaire to elicit information on
clinical aspects, predisposing factors, risk factors, place of
residence, and recent urban mobility within the city of
Murcia was administered to 662 persons with suspected
cases, most within 24 to 48 hours after the case was report-
ed. A computerized database was set up as well as maps
showing geographically referenced cases and a spatial
analysis by census division that used a geographic infor-
mation system (14). 
Case-Control Study
Inclusion in the study was restricted to patients who had
confirmed LD, were residents outside the city of Murcia,
and had been reported July 8–20 as case-patients. Each
case-patient was matched to two controls according to
place of residence, sex, and age. Controls were randomly
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A standardized questionnaire to interview patients and
controls was designed. It focused on urban mobility and
exposure to outside air within the northern part of  Murcia
2 weeks before the patient’s onset of illness. Patients and
controls were interviewed in person at home between July
25 and August 8. Itineraries of all participants, including
information about means of transport and frequency of
trips, were outlined on a map of Murcia. In addition, any
travel into or visit to 30 specific zones of the city in which
putative sources of contaminated aerosols were located
was recorded. The questionnaire also requested informa-
tion about place of residence and work, occupation, educa-
tion level, employment status, smoking habit, alcohol
intake, chronic lung disease, diabetes, renal or heart dis-
ease, malignancy, immunocompromising disease, organ
transplant, therapy with corticosteroids, and other risk fac-
tors for LD within 2 weeks before illness.
A multivariate analysis that used conditional logistic
regression was conducted to calculate odds ratios (OR)
with 95% confidence intervals (CI) as estimates of the rel-
ative risk for LD associated with a person’s travel through
each zone; we controlled for the confounding effects of
traveling through other zones. Any zone of exposure that
was significant in univariate analysis or showed biologic
plausibility as a source was entered into the multiple analy-
sis. The frequency with which participants visited Murcia
city was also introduced into the multivariate analysis.
Statistical analysis was conducted with STATA software
(15). 
Strategies of Analysis
Exposure zones were analyzed in two ways after codi-
fication of the information obtained from each patient or
control as he or she traveled or did not travel through a) the
area defined by the block around a building with a cooling
tower or the block around an ornamental fountain (in this
way, 30 zones of the northern part of the city were coded),
and b) the area delineated by a circle of 200 m radius
around a cooling tower or a large ornamental fountain.
Therefore, eight high-risk zones  were studied.
In all cases, for each area of exposure, how the patient
or control traveled through the area (i.e., walking [a cate-
gory that also included bicycling or motorbiking] or driv-
ing [a car, bus, or truck]) was specified. This information
was analyzed for the following: a) walking versus not
passing through a zone or b) walking versus not passing
through an area or traveling through it by car. Finally, for
all possibilities, data were analyzed in two further ways: a)
complete, which took into account all persons in the study,
or b) restricted, which took into account only the trios of
case-patients and their two paired controls in which all
three persons stated that they had visited Murcia in the
study period. 
Environmental Investigation
Possible sources of aerosols were inspected, and water
samples were collected from the water supply network and
from 339 installations (e.g., cooling towers, storage tanks,
and decorative fountains). Cooling towers were identified
by aerial inspection because no census of these installa-
tions was available. Attack rates by residence were used to
determine in which locations inspections and environmen-
tal samplings could be conducted. 
Microbiologic Study 
Environmental samples were processed according to
ISO 11731/1998. Environmental and clinical L. pneu-
mophila serogroup 1 isolates were typed by monoclonal
antibody (MAb) with International and Dresden MAb pan-
els (16,17) and compared by three molecular methods,
amplified fragment length polymorphism (AFLP), pulsed-
field gel electrophoresis (PFGE)-SfiI, and arbitrarily
primed–polymerase chain reaction (AP-PCR) (18–20).
Results
Descriptive Epidemiology
The outbreak of pneumonia was detected on the
evening of July 7, when the Regional Department was
notified that an increase in pneumonia cases had occurred
in three hospitals in Murcia. Legionella antigen was
detected in some patients’ urine. Approximately 800 sus-
pected cases were reported July 8–22; confirmed cases
numbered 449. We estimate that 636–696 persons were
affected. These estimates took into account the sensitivity
of the antigen test in urine of 70% (4) and the background
number of pneumonia cases estimated from the median of
patients admitted with pneumonia in the region’s hospitals
during the summers from 1996 through 2000.
Onset of illness of the first confirmed case-patient was
June 26. Until July 1, only a small number of cases
occurred. After this date, the outbreak became explosive,
with most cases occurring in <10 days (83% of confirmed
cases had onset from July 2 through July 9). The last case-
patient became ill on July 19 (Figure 1). The outbreak was
considered compatible with massive exposure to a com-
mon source of contamination. When LD’s incubation peri-
od was taken into account, the maximum emission was
estimated to have occurred June 29–July 1 and to have
ended completely July 9–17.
Hospital admission was necessary for 64% of all report-
ed case-patients and 74% of confirmed case-patients. Six
deaths from LD were confirmed to be directly related to
this outbreak, five confirmed cases and one suspected.
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cases only and 0.9% for total estimated cases. For all con-
firmed case-patients, 74% were men and 26% women. The
age range was from 19 to 91 years; 70% were >50, and 29%
were >70. The incidence rate increased with age in both
sexes and was higher in men in all age groups (Figure 2).
Of the confirmed case-patients, 68% lived in Murcia
city proper, 16% in the satellite districts within the munic-
ipality of Murcia, and 16% in other municipalities of the
region. To evaluate the risk by quarters within the city of
Murcia, the Standardized Incidence Ratio (SIR) was used.
Three neighborhoods located in the northern part of the
city had the highest incidence rate (4.9–6.7 per 1,000 pop-
ulation), significantly higher than the average for the city
of Murcia (Table 1, Figure 3). According to epidemiologic
interviews, 95% of the confirmed case-patients lived,
worked, or visited in the northern districts in the 10 days
before the outbreak began. 
L. pneumophila serogroup 1 was recovered from clini-
cal samples of 19 patients; 18 samples were characterized.
All were Pontiac (MAb 2+) Philadelphia MAb type and
shared an identical molecular pattern by AFLP, PFGE-SfiI,
and AP-PCR.
Case-Control Study
The descriptive study showed no common indoor
source of exposure and determined that the outbreak was
provoked by a common source located in the northern part
of the city. The study hypothesis was that the outbreak had
its origin in environmental contamination from cooling
towers or other installations capable of producing and dis-
persing large quantities of aerosols potentially contaminat-
ed by legionellae.
A total of 85 cases and 170 controls were included in a
case-control study. Participation in the case-control study
was classified as recently proposed by Olsen et al. (21).
The response rate among eligible cases was 89% (85/96)
and 96% (85/89) among those eligible who were contact-
ed. The response rate among persons selected as eligible
controls was 51% (170/334) and 61% (170/279) among
those eligible who were contacted. The distribution of
cases and controls according to sex, age, and residence was
identical. No significant differences were found between
cases and controls in any of the variables considered as a
risk for or predisposing factor to the disease, as shown in
Table 2. No differences were found with respect to educa-
tion level or employment situation (Table 3). A strong
association between visiting the city of Murcia and being
ill with LD was found (OR 14.1, 95% CI 4.2 to 45.9). 
The zone of exposure, defined either by the block sur-
rounding hospital H or by a circle of 200 m in radius
around hospital H, was significantly associated with illness
in all eight models of multivariate analysis (Table 4). This
zone of exposure also showed a much higher OR in every
model. Thus, LD was 4.8–11.4 times more likely to devel-
op in persons who passed through the zone around hospi-
tal H during the risk period than in persons who did not
travel through this zone, independent of their having
passed through the other zones. These results were also
independent of the number of times the patient had visited
the city. 
An association between the illness and walking through
the zone was observed in the multivariate analysis for
another three zones of exposure. However, none of these
zones appeared in more than two of the eight models, and
each had an OR that was lower or much lower than that for
the zone around hospital H in the corresponding model.
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Figure 1. Confirmed cases of Legionnaires’ disease by date of
onset of illness, Murcia, Spain, June 26–July 19, 2001. 
Figure 2. Confirmed cases of Legionnaires’ disease within the city
of Murcia, Spain. Specific incidence rates by sex and age (per
100,000).Nosocomial Outbreak at Hospital H
During the epidemiologic study of this community out-
break of LD, a nosocomial outbreak of LD at hospital H
was discovered. In all 11 definite or probable nosocomial
cases, some portion of the previous 10-day period of hos-
pitalization coincided with the period when the cooling
towers could have been active.
Environmental Inspection and Microbiologic 
Study of Environmental Samples 
L. pneumophila was not recovered from water samples
from the drinking water supply network in the city of
Murcia. L. pneumophila serogroup 1 Pontiac (MAb 2+)
was recovered from 22 installations (cooling towers of 11
buildings in the city and water storage tanks from 3 build-
ings). Ten of 11 cooling towers contained a Philadelphia
MAb-type strain, but only two colonies, recovered in
October from a cooling tower of hospital H, were indistin-
guishable from the patient strains by AFLP (Figure 4).
Identical results were obtained when PFGE-SfiI and AP-
PCR were applied. 
Weather Conditions
Data provided by the Weather Centre of Murcia showed
that during the last days of June and early July some
atmospheric thermal inversion occurred every day, except
one. Winds were predominantly from the northeast quad-
rant with a very low average speed (9 kph) and very high
temperatures (33.5°C–35°C).
Discussion
This LD outbreak is the largest to date in the world,
with 449 confirmed cases and an estimated total number of
cases of 650. The reported case-fatality rate (1%) is much
lower than those observed in other community outbreaks
(22,23). This rate can be attributed, at least partially, to the
quick detection of the outbreak, early diagnosis of the dis-
ease, and appropriate treatment of patients. The explosive
quality of the outbreak not only led patients to seek quick
assistance at hospital emergency units but also helped cli-
nicians to perform an accurate diagnosis and to immediate-
ly initiate adequate treatment, factors reported as linked to
low case fatality (24,25). This explosive appearance could
also be related to a lower presence of predisposing factors
in case-patients in comparison with other community out-
breaks (7,9,13), which could also partially explain the low
case-fatality rate.
The initial investigation encountered obstacles, such as
a large number of potential sources of environmental con-
tamination located in the northern part of the city and the
absence of environmental Legionella isolates identical to
those of patients. The case-control study showed a signifi-
cant association, with a high consistency between the ana-
lyzed models and with a high magnitude of association,
between passing through the zone around hospital H and
being ill with LD. Results were similar even when the area
radius was expanded to 400 m. However, large overlap of
areas was observed within this radius, and multicollineari-
ty among zones was a common finding.
The case-control study was designed to select patients
residing outside the city of Murcia. We decided on this
approach for two reasons. First, the incidence of LD was
almost 1% in some neighborhoods, a rate within the 0.1%
to 5% attack rate described for this disease (26) Therefore,
all the persons living in these quarters could possibly have
been exposed to Legionella, as has been described in out-
breaks of other transmissible diseases (27). If everyone
had been exposed, finding incidence differences between
persons exposed and those not exposed would have been
almost impossible. Second, persons residing outside the
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Table 1. Confirmed cases of Legionnaires’ disease within Murcia city, Murcia, Spain 
Neighborhood  Confirmed cases  Inhabitants  Incidence per 1,000  SIR
a (95% CI) 
Sta. Mª de Gracia  90  13,410  6.7  6.3 (5.1 to 7.8) 
Vistalegre  62  12,677  4.9  4.8 (3.7 to 6.1) 
San Antón  48  9,373  5.1  5.2 (3.8 to 6.9) 
San Miguel  28  9,511  2.9  2.5 (1.5 to 3.3) 
San Basilio  17  5,509  3.1  3.0 (1.8 to 4.8) 
Santiago Z  8  3,215  2.5  2.5 (1.1 to 4.9) 
San Pio X  4  824  4.8  4.2 (1.1 to 10.8) 
aSIR, standardized incidence ratio by neighborhood within Murcia city. Only results of neighborhoods with SIR >1 are represented; CI, confidence intervals. 
Figure 3. Confirmed cases of Legionnaires’ disease within Murcia
city, Spain. Standardized Incidence Ratio (SIR) by neighborhood.
Circle represents hospital H.city would probably have a more accurate memory of the
itineraries they followed in Murcia some weeks previous-
ly and would probably have a lesser number of routes than
persons living within the city. Conducting 255 personal
interviews with questions about itineraries within 2 weeks
from the last case and 4 weeks from the outbreak onset
may also have been important to our findings. 
One concern in case-control studies is that participation
rate is not reported consistently (21). Indeed, this informa-
tion is usually omitted in case-control studies of outbreaks,
especially when controls are selected from a population
database, as was our situation. A further complication was
that the study had to be conducted in July, when many peo-
ple go on holiday. In spite of achieving the participation of
one in two controls whom we initially selected, we evalu-
ated possible selection bias. We determined that it was
unlikely to have occurred since neither socioeconomic sta-
tus nor predisposing risk factors for LD differed signifi-
cantly among cases and controls. Information bias overes-
timating this outcome was ruled out since news media did
not mention hospital H among the probable sources of the
outbreak.
Meteorologic conditions were favorable for the emis-
sion of aerosols to be dispersed in a horizontal manner.
Low wind speed together with atmospheric thermal inver-
sion between June 29 and July 1 would have facilitated the
presence of the aerosols in the environment (9). 
The result of the epidemiologic study was subsequent-
ly confirmed by the isolation of a strain retrieved on
October 30 from a sample from one of the cooling towers
of the same hospital; that strain is identical to the strain
isolated from the patients. The difficulties found previous-
ly in the isolation of this strain were not unexpected. The
day after the outbreak was detected, when the first sample
was taken, the cooling towers of hospital H were highly
chlorinated, which could explain why these first samples
gave negative results. Later samples retrieved on four dif-
ferent dates between July 28 and September 13 showed
positive results to L. pneumophila but were characterized
as different strains from those from patients. This strain
was only isolated upon the restarting of one tower after it
was shut down for more than 1 month, a condition that
favors the reappearance of Legionella (8,12,13). The fact
that the same clone of Legionella can be found in an instal-
lation for long periods is also documented (28,29). The
possible contamination of the tower by new Legionella
from the water supply was ruled out since the strain linked
to the outbreak was not found in samples collected from
many other installations during the same period, including
July to November.
The coincidence of a nosocomial LD outbreak in hospi-
tal H reinforces the previous hypothesis. A nosocomial out-
break of LD as part of a wider community outbreak of the
disease has been described (12,30), although in other out-
breaks originating in the cooling towers of a hospital no
cases of nosocomial LD were identified (7). The use of dou-
ble HEPAfilters on air-intake vents in some hospitals could
justify, at least in part, these contradictory observations. 
Our research indicates that the cooling towers of a hos-
pital located in the northeastern part of the city of Murcia
were the origin of this community outbreak. This study
underlines important risk factors that must be taken into
account to prevent a new LD outbreak. First, cooling tow-
ers had to be identified by aerial and direct inspection in
the absence of any census of such installations. Second, the
size, location, and state of maintenance of cooling towers
are very important. In contrast with epidemics associated
with relatively small systems (8), this outbreak was related
to a large refrigeration system that seems to have infected
patients up to 1.3 km downwind to the west from the cool-
ing tower; this finding suggests that airborne infection with
L. pneumophila may extend over a large distance from the
dissemination source, as has been reported elsewhere
(9,10). Although most of the installations in the area
showed inadequate maintenance, the cooling towers from
hospital H were poorly maintained and had a high-risk size
and location. Once the outbreak was identified, urgent
measures were undertaken to clean, disinfect, or close pos-
sibly contaminated sources. The cooling tower that was the
source of the outbreak was subsequently replaced by an
air-cooled system. 
Before June 2001, no specific national legislation exist-
ed in Spain concerning LD, although a recommendation
guide and legislation existed in several Spanish
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Table 2. Risk factors for Legionnaires’ disease patients and 
controls, Murcia, Spain 
Predisposing factors  Cases n=85  Controls n=170 
Smoking (%)  43.5  40.6 
Alcohol intake (cc/week)  134  106 
Chronic illness or  immuno-
suppressive therapy (%) 
 
16.5 
 
14.7 
Previous hospitalization (%)  1.2  1.8 
Previous travel (%)  11.8  13.5 
Table 3. Educational level and employment status for 
Legionnaires’ disease cases and controls, Murcia, Spain 
Education and employment  Cases (n=85)  Controls (n=170) 
Educational level (%)     
  Primary  52.9  51.5 
  Secondary  38.8  37.3 
  University  8.2  11.2 
Employment status (%)     
  Employed  65.5  63.5 
  Unemployed  5.9  3.6 
  Retired  19.1  21.1 
  Housewife/husband  8.3  8.4 
  Student  1.2  3.0 autonomous regions that had had community LD out-
breaks (31). As an immediate consequence of this out-
break, a national law about prevention and control of LD
was enacted in Spain 20 days after the outbreak began
(32). The extent of this outbreak is useful to assess the rel-
ative role of cooling towers as a source of LD and high-
lights the importance of prioritizing control measures
related to cooling towers among strategies to prevent LD
in the community. Compliance with these measures would
help to reduce not only community outbreaks but also, per-
haps, sporadic cases that could be due to infected cooling
towers (33).
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Table 4. Association between Legionnaires’ disease and a patient’s traveling through specific areas of the northern part of the city of 
Murcia, Spain
a 
Block-area study  Circle area study 
Complete analysis  Restricted analysis  Complete analysis  Restricted analysis 
OR  
(95% CI) 
OR  
(95% CI) 
OR  
(95% CI) 
OR 
(95% CI) 
OR 
(95% CI) 
OR 
(95% CI) 
OR 
(95% CI) 
OR 
(95% CI) 
Area of city 
Walking vs. 
not passing 
through 
Walking vs. 
not passing 
through or 
passing  by 
driving 
Walking vs.  
not passing 
through 
Walking vs. 
not passing 
through or 
passing by 
driving 
Walking vs. 
not passing 
through 
Walking vs. 
not passing 
through or 
passing  by 
driving 
Walking vs. 
not passing 
through 
Walking vs. 
not passing 
through or 
passing by 
driving 
Hospital H  10.2 
(3.6 to 28.8) 
9.7 
(3.9 to 23.6) 
10.7 
(2.5 to 45.5) 
6.0 
(1.9 to 18.4) 
6.9 
(1.8 to 26.0) 
6.4 
(2.5 to 15.7) 
11.4 
(3.2 to 40.1) 
4.8 
(1.5 to 5.2) 
Garden P  5.2 
(1.0 to 25.8) 
4.6 
(1.2 to 17.0) 
           
Car-park X          5.1 
(1.7 to 14.9) 
3.6 
(1.4 to 9.2) 
   
Commercial  
building 
          2.9 
(1.1 to 7.4) 
   
aAreas associated to the disease in a multivariate analysis of data from eight different models. OR, odds ratio; 
CI, confidence interval. 
Figure 4. Amplified fragment length polymorphism (AFLP) gel contain-
ing outbreak human and environmental Legionella pneumophila
serogroup 1 isolates. M, molecular weight marker (Ladder Mix, MBI
Fermentas, UK). Lanes 1 and 2, two colonies from a cooling tower of
the hospital H. Lines 3 and 4, human isolates. Lanes 5 and 6, human
isolates. Lanes 7–11, different environmental isolates from several
Murcia installations. References
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